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RECENT DECISIONS
EXTRATERRITORIAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE COAST GUARD POLICE POWERS IN FOREIGN
TERRITORIAL WATERS: WHAT PRICE EXPANSION?
- UNITED STATES v. CONROY
A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 1 has
greatly broadened the authority of the United States Coast Guard
to apprehend domestic vessels suspected of drug smuggling and
other illicit operations. The reasoning behind this expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was based on a te.nuous precedent.
In United States v. Conroy, a United States Coast Guard cutter, pursuant to information supplied by a Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) informant, attempted to apprehend the American
sailboat Nahoa in international waters. The Nahoa chose to turn
and run for sanctuary in nearby Haitian waters. To the surprise of
her crew, 2 the Nahoa was pursued and subsequently subdued by the
threat of cannon fire in waters within Haitian territorial limits. The
Coast Guard successfully pursued the Nahoa into Haitian territorial
waters after first obtaining permission by radio from the Haitian
Chief-of-Staff. After consent to an inspection had been refused, 3 a
boarding party combed the Nahoa and uncovered and seized 7,000
pounds of marijuana.' The defendants protested that without a warrant and without express statutory authority to conduct a search
within foreign waters, the Coast Guard had exercised powers that
1. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 594 F.2d 241
(5th Cir. 1979).
2. Id. at 1267. The court, citing P. JESSUP, THE LAw or TERRIToRIAL WATERS AND MARITIME
JURISDICTION 120 (1927), recalled the traditional law of the sea doctrine that foreign warships
did not "enjoy an absolute legal right to pass through a state's territorial waters."
The Nahoa undoubtedly set course for Haitian waters in reliance on this doctrine without
realizing that it had become outdated.
3. The Coast Guard may apprehend and board any vessel under the American flag; such
authority is plenary and need not be founded on any particularized suspicion. Once on board,
the Coast Guard may conduct documentation and safety inspections. If, during the course of
such inspection, circumstances arise which generate probable cause to believe that a violation
of United States law has occurred, the Coast Guard may search, seize, and make arrests. See,
14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976); Tariff Act of 1930 § 581(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976); U.S. CONST.
amend. 4.
4. The enforcement provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 prescribed penalties and fines
for the transportation of marijuana and other contraband. 19 U.S.C. § 1584 (1976) states, in
part: "If any of such merchandise so found consists of smoking opium, opium prepared for
smoking, or marijuana, the master of such vessel . . . shall be liable to a penalty of $25 for
each ounce thereof so found."
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neither Congress nor the Constitution had conferred upon it. 5
The Court was unimpressed by this argument. 6 It conceded that
under normal lie-in-wait situations a search warrant would have
been the minimum requirement for such an invasion of the defendant's seacruise. 7 Nevertheless, the Nahoa did not follow normal
hailing procedures, which would have been to identify herself and
submit to an inspection of the captain's log and safety devices.
Instead she fled in an obvious attempt to obtain sanctuary in foreign
territorial waters, thereby evoking an exception to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition of warrantless searches based on the exigency of the· suspect's uncontrolled mobility. 8 The DEA informant's
information having supplied the requisite antecedent probable
cause, the Coast Guard had sufficient reason to pursue the Nahoa
in order to secure and preserve instrumentalities of the suspected
crime. 9
The most remarkable element of Conroy is the judicial recognition of certain Coast Guard powers as viable and affirmative within
the jurisdictional waters of another sovereignty . 10 Two Fifth Circuit
5. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976); U.S. CONST. amend. 4. The language of the enforcement
provision of the Coast Guard Act refers only to the "high seas," and does not expressly
mention foreign territorial waters as being open to Coast Guard police activities.
6. 589 F.2d at 1268-1269.
7. Id. at 1269.
8. Id. See, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1923).
9. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 594 F.2d 241
(5th Cir. 1979); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1923).
10. Although the Supreme Court has held that the United States has legislative authority over its citizens on the high seas and in foreign territory, no decision has extended this
power to territorial waters of a foreign sovereign. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280
(1952) (the United States possesses authority to regulate trademark infringements by an
American citizen in Mexico); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (Congress possesses
the authority to control overtime pay of workers in the employ of American contractors in
Iran and Iraq, but it did not intend to exercise its power).
In addition, the Tariff Act of 1930 allows examination of foreign vessels without the
customs waters of the United States by customs officers pursuant to a "special arrangement"
with the foreign government. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1587 (1976). Close examination of 14 U.S.C .
§ 89(a) (1976) indicates no such open-ended grant of authority to the Coast Guard in terms
of domestic vessels. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides in relevant part:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures,
and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United
States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any
time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's
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decisions decided a year earlier embodied the spirit of the expansive
holding in Conroy. United States v. Warren 11 and United States v.
Cadena 12 both interpreted the Coast Guard enforcement provisions
found in section 89(a) of title 14 of the United States Code. Section
89(a) extends the Coast Guard's authority to detain, board, and
search domestic vessels believed to have violated laws of the United
States on the high seas. 13 Both cases held that the Coast Guard had
authority to search on the high seas under section 89(a) by reason
of its reliance on "the jurisdiction, or . . . operation of any law of
the United States." 14 Neither the Warren nor the Cadena opinions,
both concerning high seas searches and seizures of marijuana, so
exceeded the scope of their respective circumstances as to suggest
that suspected smugglers could be sought out in foreign waters.
In so enlarging the geographical boundaries of the Coast
Guard's authority to conduct searches of domestic vessels, Judge
Rubin, writing for the Fifth Circuit in Conroy, relied on implicit
legislative history, not on express statutory language. 15 The opinion
also relied on the United Nations-sponsored Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Convention), 16 to which the
United States and Haiti are signatories. 17 The fact that the exercise
of Coast Guard powers took place within the Haitian territorial sea
seemingly placed no great burden on the court. By virtue of the
doctrine of innocent passage, incorporated into Article 14 of the
Convention to permit innocent passage of foreign warships not engaged in combat, 18 the Coast Guard was, according to the court,
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all
necessary force to compel compliance.
11. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
12. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), supra note 10.
14. Id. (emphasis added). See, 578 F.2d at 1069; 585 F.2d at 1257.
15. In regards to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976), Judge Rubin said:
Because neither mandate nor prohibition of search can be divined from Section
89(a), the Coast Guard's authority, if it exists, must be . . . an incident of its other
powers . . . . The pattern of legislation from 1790 to 1927 traced by Mr. Justice
Brandeis [concurring in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927)] and the subsequent Congressional action . . . make it clear that, in the absence of objection by
the sovereign power involved, Congress intended the Coast Guard to have authority
to stop and search American vessels on foreign waters . . . even though it never said
so with unequivocal didacticism. 589 F.2d at 1266-1267.
16. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter
cited as the Convention].
17. Id.
18. Id. Article 14 of the Convention, supra note 16, provides in relevant part:
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acting within the scope of its duties. Since Article 14 permits the
unannounced entrance of all ships into territorial waters, 1!1 Judge
Rubin concluded that the implicit authority of section 89(a) of title
14 of the United States Code 20 permitted the Coast Guard to conduct its duties as it would on the high seas.
The court's oblique interpretation of the Convention raises the
question of whether there is a possible jurisdictional flaw in its
decision to sanction police powers extra territorially. 21 Regardless of
whether or not the Convention permits foreign warships to innocently ply a nation's territorial sea, 22 it neither expressly nor impliedly expands jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign beyond limits
currently in effect. 23 Although the Coast Guard had implied permis1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal
or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either
of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal
waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters.
4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with
these articles and with other rules of international law. Convention, supra note 16,
15 U.S.T. at 1610.
The Conroy opinion claims that "[n]o distinction is made between warships and other
vessels." 589 F.2d at 1267. Coast Guard vessels can therefore ply foreign territorial waters for
the reasons set forth in Article 14(2) and (4) of the Convention. Contrary to the court's claim,
the Convention does distinguish warships from civilian or other government vessels. Article
23 contemplates coastal state action against foreign warships if Article 14 is not upheld: "If
any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it, the
coastal State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea." Convention, supra note
16, art. 23.
19. Convention, supra note 16, art. 14(1).
20. 589 F.2d at 1267-1268.
21. The Convention addresses the situation that occurred in Conroy in Article 19(5),
which provides virtually unbridled freedom of passage through a coastal state's waters by a
merchant ship:
The coastal State may not take any steps c:in board a foreign ship passing through
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion
(sic) with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship,
proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without
entering internal waters. Convention, supra note 16, art. 19(5).
Regardless of how the court weighed Mr. Justice Brandeis' influence on the legislation
of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) through his concurrence in Maul v. United States, supra note 15, Coast
Guard authority thereunder appears geographically exhausted by the term "high seas." Had
Congress anticipated extending the authority to conduct searches into foreign territorial
waters, it could have indicted it in more explicit terms.
22. Supra note 18.
23. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977), involved the reversal of a
conviction of an American citizen for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
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sion to pass through Haitian waters, section 89(a) of title 14 of the
United States Code does not automatically apply. Rather, section
89(a) extends only so far with respect to the "high seas" as expressed
in its terms.
A more concrete ground for extension of the authority to search
extraterritorially is barely recognized by the court: the Haitian
Chief-of-Staff's explicit, oral authorization of the pursuit of the
Nahoa amounted to consent to a Coast Guard search in Haitian
waters. 24 The court gave only nominal weight to this, which was
possibly the most sound basis for authority available. 25
Authority for the Coast Guard's mere presence in Haitian waters is secure under Article 14 of the Convention. However, authority for the Coast Guard's exercise of police activities, based solely
on its presence and an "implicit recognition by the United States
Government of the power of its warship to make the search, " 26 creates an unreliable precedent in the area of the law of the sea. In a
similar situation, where express consent to an extraterritorial detention and search is withheld, courts will be hard-pressed to apply the
Conroy decision and rationale. Rights of innocent passage are not
by capturing dolphins within the three-mile limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.
That legislation was held to extend authority to control the behavior of American citizens to
the high seas, but not to the territory of other nations. A presumption is raised against
extraterritorial application of a statute, the nature of which does not mandate extraterritorial
application. This presumption is overcome by a clear showing of congressional intent. Id. at
1002.
The Conroy court confidently relies on Justice Brandeis' closing to his concurrence in
United States v. Maul as authority to search into foreign territorial waters. Examination of
the Maul decision indicates that the Justice's opinion suggests authority to search "no matter
what the place of seizure." Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 531 (1927). However, his
concurrence in toto considers only the high seas, not expressly the territorial waters of a
foreign sovereign. Consequently, the "high seas" terminology of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) does not
clearly indicate the broader congressional intent found in the Conroy court's holding, as
required by the Mitchell standards.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 44(1)(b) (1965).
25. The court found authority to conduct the extraterritorial search by essentially relying
on one provision of the Convention: the "implicit authorization for its warships to do what
the warships of other nations might do," derived from Article 14 of the Convention. 589 F.2d
at 1268. No authority is given for this interpretation of warship operations under the Convention.
Yet stricter scrutiny is invited by the court's suggestion that, even without such implicit
Coast Guard authority, the defendants had no case. Absent the implicit authority mentionE:d,
the court "would still be compelled to conclude that the defendants cannot assail the legality
of their seizure . . . . [R]edress for improper seizure in foreign waters is not due to the owner
or crew of the vessel involved, but to the foreign government whose territoriality has been
infringed by the action." The Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
26. 589 F.2d at 1268.
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readily reshaped to mandate an exercise of foreign police activity,
the authority for which hangs by a thread of tenuous legislative
guidance.
William Little

INTERNATIONAL BANKING - REPUDIATION OF
CONTRACT AND ENFORCEMENT OF LETTER OF
CREDIT AGREEMENTS - AMERICAN BELL INTERNATIONAL,
INC. v. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, BANK IRANSHAHR, AND
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST COMPANY

The recent political upheaval in Iran has created multifarious
problems between the Islamic Republic, the new governing force in
Iran, and American multinational corporations holding contracts
with the deposed Imperial Government. The results of these conflicts are beginning to reach our courts. The ensuing litigation will
determine, within the context of banking agreements, important
legal issues between the principles and their respective banks. Corresponding considerations involve the enforcement of contractual
obligations in a modern world pervaded with the intractable political problems of individual states. These considerations are acquiring important legal precedential status in the international spectrum.
Recently, a federal district court 1 applied the Caulfield criteria 2
to deny a preliminary injunction to enjoin a bank from paying the
amount demanded under a Letter of Credit. The importance of this
decision is enhanced by the fact that the Iranian government was
both the party demanding payment under the Letter of Credit and
1. American Bell International, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Iranshahr and
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, No. 79-3904 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Bell].
2. Caulfield v. Board of Education, 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978). In Caulfield, the United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, recently clarified the standard for issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The Caulfield case concerned a federal district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the mandatory answering of ethnic questionnaires. In denying the plaintifrs motion, the Caulfield court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Id. at 610.
The court in the Bell case made findings of fact and law concerning probable success on
the merits and the seriousness of the litigation. Bell, supra note 1.
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the party whose breach of contract made the demand callable. The
case raises serious questions with respect to the future involvement
of American companies in the more unstable nations of the world.
The decision may have the impact of deterring involvement by
American companies otherwise willing to invest substantial funds
and effort to contract with foreign governments. The fear that
American courts will apply nebulous balancing standards that may
impair these companies' equitable and contractual rights may have
a chilling effect on dealings with foreign states. The recent decision
affecting American Bell International, Inc. demonstrates this problem.
On July 23, 1978, plaintiff American Bell International, Inc., 3
entered into a contract with the Imperial Government of Iran to
provide consulting services and advanced equipment to develop
Iran's nationwide telecommunications system. The contract provided for a total payment of $280,000,000 to Bell, including a down
payment of $38,800,000. The down payment was callable upon demand by the Imperial Government with a 20 percent deduction of
the amounts invoiced by Bell. At the date of the subsequent breach,
$30,200,000 of the down payment remained callable. Under the
terms of the contract, Bell was required to secure an unconditional
and irrevocable Letter of Guaranty 4 for $38,800,000, to be issued by
the defendant Bank Iranshahr to the Imperial Government of Iran. 5
In return for issuing a Letter of Guaranty to Bell, Bank Iranshahr
required Bell to obtain a standby Letter of Credit6 in favor of Bank
lranshahr in the amount of $38,800,000. The Letter of Credit was
issued by defendant Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. 7
3. Bell is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Telephone & Telegraph Company.
4. A Letter of Guaranty is generally defined as a collateral promise or undertaking by
one person to answer for the payment of some debt or the performance of some duty (in case
of default) of another person liable therefore in the first instance. Cargill, Inc. v. Buis, 543
F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1976).
5. The parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Iranian courts to settle any
disputes arising out of the contract.
6. A Letter of Credit primarily provides an assurance to the selling party of prompt
payment against documents. It defines the terms of conditions upon which, and only upon
which, the payment will be made, and which, within the strict limits of those terms and
conditions, engages the full primary responsibility of the bank to make payment. Venizelos,
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970). For a good general discussion of how a Letter of Credit agreement operates in the sphere of international banking,
American East India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141 (D.C. Pa. 1975). In Bell, the
Letter of Credit was required to secure reimbursement to Bank Iranshahr if it was required
to pay the Iranian Government under its Letter of Guaranty.
7. The standby Letter of Credit provided for payment by Manufacturers Hanover to
Bank Iranshahr upon receipt of the following:
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Bell commenced performance under the contract, providing
services and equipment pursuant to its obligations. 8 In January
1979, the Islamic Republic overthrew the Imperial Government.
This resulted in a repudiation of all contractual obligations by Iran
and left Bell with substantial unpaid invoices for services rendered.
Bell subsequently ceased performance and on February 16, 1979,
brought an action 9 against Manufacturers Hanover in the Supreme
Court, New York County, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting Manufacturers Hanover from honoring any demand for payment
under the Letter of Credit. The motion was denied on March 26,
1979 and was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, First
Department.
On August 1, 1979, Manufacturers Hanover notified Bell that
a conforming demand 10 had been received. The following text is an
examination of the decision rendered by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, denying Bell's new motion
for a preliminary injunction.
The court decided this motion in light of the tests set forth in
Caulfield v. Board of Education. 11 The court in Caulfield held that
there must be "a showing of possible irreparable injury and either
Your [Bank lranshahr's] dated statement purportedly signed by an officer indicating name and title or your Tested Telex Reading: (A) 'Referring Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. Credit No. SCl 70027, the amount of our claim $represents funds
due us as we have received a written request from the Imperial Government of Iran
Ministry of War to pay them the sum of under our Guarantee No. issued for the
account of American B-el1 International, Inc. covering advance payment under
Contract No. 138 dated July 23, 1978 and such payment has been made by us' . . . .
Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 3.
In the application for the Letter of Credit, Bell agreed immediately to reimburse Manufacturers Hanover for all amounts paid by Manufacturers Hanover to Bank Iranshahr pursuant to the Letter of Credit. Id.
8. The evidence presented to the court indicated that Bell sent numerous invoices for
services and equipment, but had received only partial payment at the time it ceased performance. Id.
9. Bell brought its action before a demand had been made by Bank Iranshahr for payment under the Letter of Credit. Id. at 4.
10. On July 25 and 29, 1978, Manufacturers Hanover received demands by Tested Telex
from Bank lranshahr for payments of $30,220, 724 under the Letter of Credit, the remaining
balance of the down payment. Asserting that the demand did not conform with the Letter of
Credit, Manufacturers Hanover declined payment and so informed Bank lranshahr. Informed
of this, Bell responded by filing this action and an application, by way of order to show cause,
for a temporary restraining order, engendering this motion for a preliminary injunction.
Following argument, the court granted a temporary restraining order on July 29th enjoining
Manufacturers Hanover from making any payment to Bank lranshahr until forty-eight hours
after Manufacturers Hanover notified Bell of the receipt of a conforming demand, and the
order extended pending decision of this motion. Id.
11. 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978).
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(1) probable success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious ques-

tions going to the merits to make it fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting
the preliminary relief." 12
First, the court considered whether Bell would be suffering irreparable injury if no preliminary injunction was granted to enjoin
Manufacturers Hanover from paying on the Letter of Credit. 13 The
court considered two contentions 14 in rendering its decision and
found for the defendants in both instances. Bell asserted that it had
no effective remedy or legal recourse if payment was made because
it must institute suit in Iran pursuant to the jurisdictional agreement by the contracting parties. 15 This, Bell claimed would result
in a hopeless submission to Iranian law as interpreted by Iranian
courts. 16 The court recognized the fact that Iranian authorities had
reached a zenith of anti-American fanaticism and the likelihood 17
that an Iranian court would objectively uphold an American multinational corporation's contract rights against the state was incredibly remote. 18 The court held, however, that Bell failed to demonstrate that it was without adequate remedy under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act. 19 In so holding, the court did not discuss
12. Id. at 610.
13. See Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 5.
14. Bell only claimed that it would be precluded from suing in Iranian courts. It did not
assert that it would be unable to sue Manufacturers Hanover in American courts. The court
notes that Bell's failure to show why it would be prevented from suing Manufacturers Hanover, for violation of the Letter of Credit, in American courts constitutes insufficient grounds
for a proper showing of irreparable injury. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli, No. 79-1167 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1979)
for a general appraisal of the current situation in Iran and the effect it is having on American
companies' assertion of contract rights with Iranian entities.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (Supp. 1979) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1979) provides:
(b) [A]ny property in the United States of an agency of instrumentality of a
foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment
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the probable outcome if the decision had been rendered against the
Iranian state. Ordering Iran to repay the funds received under the
Letter of Credit, following a successful suit by Bell in the American
courts, would arguably present problems similar to the admittedly
futile act of bringing suit in the Iranian courts. Manufacturers Hanover, having lost to Bell in an American court, would be forced to
sue Iran to recover its loss, thus encouraging the very kind of international problem that the district court was trying to avoid. 20
The court, having concluded that Bell failed to demonstrate
irreparable injury, 21 turned to the second22 Caulfield test to determine if grounds existed for granting the preliminary injunction.
Under that test, the plaintiff must have shown, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that either a demand for payment on Manufacturers Hanover's Letter of Credit had not been made, 23 or that the
demand, although in conformity, should not be honored because of
fraud 24 in the transaction. The court effectively precluded granting
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this
Act if(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality
is not immune by virtue of § 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5), or § 1605(b) of this
chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was used for the activity
upon which the claim is based.
20. Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Caulfield requires a plaintiff, upon failing in his attempt to show irr~parable injury,
to demonstrate probable success on the merits. 583 F.2d at 610.
23. This requirement concerns whether the demand is in strict conformity with the
Letter of Credit. For a general discussion of strict conformity, see 425 F.2d at 465.
See Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 6, which sets forth the facts upon which the court
dispenses with the discrepancy between the amount in the demand and in the Letter of
Credit. The court found the dissimilarity between the named beneficiaries on the two documents to be irrelevant. Id. at 7.
The court dismissed any contention that the new Iranian Government had any right to
demand payment under a Letter of Guaranty, payable only to its predecessor, by setting forth
the long-held proposition that American courts traditionally view contract rights as vesting
not in any particular government, but in the state for which that government is an agent.
Furthermore, the United States Government has officially recognized the Peoples Islamic
Republic as the legal successor to the Imperial Government of Iran, a recognition binding on
American courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938).
The court speculated that probable chaos would result if American courts commenced
finding nonconformity in international financial agreements only because the incumbent
government of a foreign state changed in makeup or ideology. Bell, supra note l, slip op. at
7.

24. The court dismissed Bell's contention that the Iranian Government perpetrated a
fraud by repudiating the contract and subsequently demanding enforcement of the Letter of
Guaranty, thereby tainting the Letter of Credit called by Bank Iranshahr. The grounds for
dismissal rested on the law of contract damages and the requirement of proof of fraudulent
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of the preliminary injunction on the grounds of nonconformity or
fraud, and left Bell with the third and final basis on which to seek
injunctive relief.
Under the third alternative test of Caulfield, a plaintiff may
seek a preliminary injunction on the grounds that (1) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits make them a fair ground for
litigation, 25 and (2) the balance of hardship tip decidedly toward the
plaintiff. 28 It is the court's analysis of this third basis which raises
some interesting considerations concerning the potential effect on
future economic involvement in politically volatile countries. Here,
the court applied a balancing test before holding that the admittedly serious and complex hardships involved did not tip against the
plaintiff Bell. 27 The court r~asoned that Bell was a large and sophisticated multinational corporation aided by competent counsel. Bell,
well aware of the intricacies of international business agreements,
voluntarily signed a contract with the Iranian Government allowing
Iran to recoup the down payment on demand without regard to
cause. Iran merely had to call the Letter of Guaranty to effectuate
the banking process which ultimately required Manufacturers Hanover to pay Bank Iranshahr the down payment upon receipt of the
conforming documents 28 without regard to cause. The court extended its balancing test by listing the potential benefits29 which
would have accrued to Bell upon completion of the contract. The
court did not consider the fact that, because of a breach of the
contract by the Iranian Government, none of the potential benefits
intent. The court noted that absent proof that Iran would refuse to pay damages upon breach
of contract, it would not presume fraudulent intent. The court observed that the law of
contract damages presumes that one who repudiates has done so because of a calculation that
such damages are cheaper than performance. This would constitute a nonfraudulent economic calculation by the Iranian Government to reclaim its down payment regardless of the
reason or consequences. The court held that this was nonfraudulent conduct. Bell, supra note
1, slip op. at 10.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id.
27. The court conceded that Bell would probably lose $30,200,000 guaranteed in the
Letter of Credit, but countered it with the potential risks of Manufacturers Hanover. Those
risks include the possibility of being sued by Bank Iranshahr and having $30,200,000 of its
assets in Iran attached to guarantee payment, the possibility of consequential damages, the
possibility that an irate Iranian Government may order its banks to attach all Manufacturers
Hanover's assets within Iran far above the amount in suit, and a loss of credibility in the
international money and banking community by failing to execute a valid Letter of Credit.
Id.
28. Id. at 12.
29. The court stated that Bell stood to gain a large monetary profit from the contract
itself and an economic benefit commensurate with the international goodwill elicited by
designing and installing a nationwide telecommunications system. Id.
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were actually realized by Bell. Bell's loss was described as an instance where "one who reaps the rewards of commercial arrangements must also accept the burdens." 30 One of the burdens was the
risk that they would lose the down payment without cause. As a
consequence of having found that all the equitable considerations
weighed against Bell, the court refused to grant a preliminary injunction. The court reached their decision knowing that both Bell
and Manufacturers Hanover were innocent victims 31 of international events beyond their control and that neither was guilty of any
breach under the contract-a contract repudiated without cause by
the new Iranian Government. The district court's decision and corresponding analysis merit careful consideration. Finally, in the legal
context, the long-range effect of the holding on American companies' international business ventures in unstable countries warrants
a watchful eye.

John D. Bouchard
30. Id.

31. The court readily admitted Bell's total noncomplicity in any wrongdoing or breach
under the contract. Id.
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BOOK REVIEW
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, Compiled and Edited by Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S.K. Lee, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Sijthoff & Nvordhoff, 1979. Vol.
I: Pp. xv, 479; Vol. II: Pp. xii, 550.
Jasentuliyana's and Lee's MANUAL ON SPACE LAW consists of
two volumes totaling over 1000 pages of texts and documents. Volume I is divided into two parts, dealing respectively with "principles
of space law," i.e., the ten existing or emerging international space
law agreements, and with "space agencies and institutions." Volume II contains the texts of existing or draft international agreements in the field of space law, accompanied, where applicable, by
a list of ratifications, signatures, accessions, a list of references to
travaux preparatoires and a selected bibliography.
Essentially Volume I is made up of contributions by individual
authors, all with an excellent reputation in the field of space law or
international law in general, and amongst whom many were closely
involved in the actual drafting of the international agreements
which they discuss. 1 As noted in the Foreword by Manfred Lachs,
Judge in the International Court of Justice and an eminent authority in the field of space law, 2 the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW is an
"achievement in itself." 3 With clarity and precision the authors
discuss the existing status of what is now generally called the
"corpus juris spatialis, "as it stands some ten years after the signing
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 the charter of international space
law. On purpose the two editors have kept editorial changes in the
individual contributions to a minimum. 5 With the high quality of
the articles in question, this editorial policy does in no way diminish
the value of the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW. What is regrettable, however, is that the editors have not seen it fit to write a more elaborate
preface or an introductory chapter to volume I. The reader is, as it
1. Contributors to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xv. (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL ON SPACE LAW].
2. Manfred Lachs is the author of THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1972) and is a former
president of the International Court of Justice.
3. Lachs, Forward to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xi.
4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL
ON SPACE LAW 1) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty J.
5. Jasentuliyana & Lee, Preface to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xiii.
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were, plunged into the details of the individual subjects without an
adequate overall introduction to the general development of international space law and its institutions.
Chapters I to IV of volume I contain largely descriptive studies
of the four international space law agreements to date, which have
been drawn up within the United Nations framework. All four instruments are based upon, and elaborate upon, the Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the. Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Resolution, adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1963. 6 The Outer Space Treaty,
opened for signature in 1967, is discussed in chapter F by Dembling.
Readers can benefit from the author's intimate knowledge of the
drafting history and the contents of the Outer Space Treaty, often
called the cornerstone of international space law. No doubt the two
most important principles enunciated by the treaty are:
a) that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies
shall be free from exploration and use by all States; 8 and
b) that no weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in earth
orbit, in outer space and on celestial bodies. 11

Amongst the other provisions of the treaty, many anticipate upon
the three remaining United Nations space law agreements, which
would be adopted subsequently. 9 · 1 As noted by Dembling in his
conclusion, the basic weakness of the treaty is the generality of its
terms leaving "much to interpretation by the parties." 10
In chapter II, 11 Lee, one of the two editors of the MANUAL ON
SPACE LAW, discusses the 1968 Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into
Outer Space. 12 After an analysis of this largely technical instrument,
6. G.A. Resolution 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963) (text
reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 373).
7. Dembling, Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW

1.

8. Id. at 9-12.
9. Id. at 12-15.
9.1. Since the publication of the Manual on Space Law

and the writing of this comment
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has finalized a draft
Moon Treaty.
10. Id. at 35.
11 . Lee, Assistance to and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON
SPACE LAW 53.
12. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
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the author concludes, amongst other things, that the agreement
ought to be amended so as to require "launching authorities to make
notification of spacecraft which is about to return to earth prematurely."13 Such an amendment could be useful in a case such as that
of Cosmos 954, which reentered the earth's atmosphere and crashed
in the Canadian Northwest Territories in January 1978. 14
The third United Nations space law treaty, the Liability Convention of 1972, 15 is dealt with at great length by Cheng in chapter
IIl. 18 The main feature of this agreement is the principle of absolute
liability of states for damage caused on earth by space objects. With
his usual lucidity, Cheng, an outstanding specialist in both the
fields of air and space law, 17 gives an excellent appraisal of the
convention. As a postscript and as alluded to by Cheng, 111 the abovementioned crash of Cosmos 954 in Canada will be the first practical
test to which the Liability Convention is put. 111 The fourth and last
United Nations agreement, 19 ·1 the Registration Treaty of 1975, 20 a
largely technical instrument, is rather briefly discussed in chapter
IV 21 by Cocca of Argentina, who for many years has been associated
with the works of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
Chapters V and VI of volume I deal with a number of international instruments in the field of space telecommunications, which
have been agreed upon outside the United Nations framework. In
chapter V editor Jasentuliyana describes the detailed regulatory
Objects launched into Outer Space, done April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.l.A.S. 6599, 672
U.N.T.S. 119 (effective Dec. 3, 1968) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 9).
13. Lee, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 73.
14. Id.; see Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6 J. SPACE L.
147 (1978).
15. Convention on International Liability for Damage Cau's ed by Space Objects, done
March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762 (effective Oct. 9, 1973) (text reproduced at 2
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 13) [hereinafter cited as the Liability Conventionj.
16. Cheng, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL
ON SPACE LAW 83.
17. Bin Cheng is the author of THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962) and is
the Professor of Air and Space Law at London University and the Chairman of the Air Law
Committee on the International Law Association.
18. Cheng, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 84.
19. See Dept. of External Affairs, Canadian Statement of Claim, Communique 8, Doc.
FLA-268, Jan. 23, 1979.
19.1. See, supra, footnote 9.1.
20. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480 (effective Sept. 15, 1976) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL
ON SPACE LAW 23) [hereinafter cited as the Registration Treaty J.
21. Cocca, Registration of Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 173.
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work of the International Telecommunications Union (l.T.U.) and
its World Administrative Radio ·Conferences (WARC) in the field of
the "judicious control of the radio spectrum and the international
standardization of frequency allocation." 22 In the following chapter
Schulze discusses the 1974 Brussels Convention on the Distribution
of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, 23 reached
within the framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIP0). 2' This convention is essentially aimed at copyright
protection but, unfortunately, does not cover broadcasts by socalled direct broadcast satellites. 25
Chapters VII to IX of volume I are individual studies of three
subjects which have been on the working program of the United
Nations COPUOS for many years, but on which the international
communty has, as yet, not been able to reach agreement with a view
to drafting conventions. These subjects are: legal principles relating
to the moon, 26 to direct satellite broadcasting, 27 and to romote sensing of the earth by satellites. 28 Perhaps a coincidence, the contributions to the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW on these three subjects are all
Canadian ones. Matte, 211 director of McGill University's Institute of
Air and Space Law, and Vlasic, 30 former director of that institute,
write on, respectively, the Draft Moon Treaty 31 and principles relating to remote sensing of the earth by satellites. Dalfen, ViceChairman of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), writes on direct broadcast satellites.
All three authors refer to the present stalemate within COPUOS
regarding these important subjects. With respect to the Draft Moon
22. Jasentuliyana, Regulations Governing Space Telecommunication, in 1 MANUAL ON
SPACE LAW 195, 195.
23. Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signal Transmitted
by Satellite, done May 21, 1974 (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 87).
24. Schulze, The Distribution of Progamme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite,
in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 239.
25. Id. at 245-46.
26. Matte, Legal Principles Relating to the Moon, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 253.
27. Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 283.
28. Vlasic, Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 303.
29. Nicholas M. Matte is the author of AEROSPACE LAW (1969) and AEROSPACE LAW FROM
SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION TO COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION (1977), and is Director of the Centre of
Research of Air and Space Law of McGill University.
30. Vlasic is a co-author of M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, and I. Vlasic, LAW AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN SPACE (1963), and is a Professor of Law at McGill University.
31. Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196 Annex I (April 11, 1977)
(text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 93) [hereinafter cited as the Draft Moon
Treaty].
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Treaty the question of the utilization of the moon's natural resources is the stumbling block; 32 for direct satellite broadcasting, it
is the conflict between the principle of freedom of information and
State sovereignty over radio and television broadcasts; 33 and for
remote sensing of the earth by satellites, it is the problem of national sovereignty over information relating to natural resources.a"
The last chapter of part one of volume I, chapter X, gives a
survey of the numerous bilateral cooperation agreements between
States in the field of space activities. 35 Most of these agreements
were concluded between the United States36 and the Soviet Union:17
on the one hand and third countries on the other. The chapter was
written by Hosenball, General Counsel of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA).
Reviewing part one of volume I as a unity, one misses separate
chapters on at least three topics which have recently attracted a
great deal of attention in the world community: the status of the
equatorial geostationary orbit, used by most communication satellites and over which eight equatorial countries now claim sovereignty. 38 Also missing are chapters on the boundary between air
space and outer space, and on the advent of solar energy satellites.
The latter subject is quite new. The former is old and had become
almost forgotten until, in 1978, the Soviet Union proposed an international agreement fixing the lower limit of outer space at 100 kilometers above sea level.
Part two of volume I deals with "space agencies and institutions." Chapters Xl, 39 XIl,'0 XV,' 1 and XVl,' 2 written by Colino,"a
32. Matte, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 264-70. See, also supra footnote 11.1.
33. Dalfen, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 296.
34. Vlasic, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 319-24.
35. Hosenball, Bilateral Agreements, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 347.
36. Id. at 347-51.
37. Id. at 351-54.
38. For the declaration of these eight countries, the so-called Bogota Declaration, see
Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 383.
For a discussion of the geostationary orbit within the framework of the l.T.U., see Jasentuliyana, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 220-23.
39. Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSA 1'), in
1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 363.
40. Kolossov, International Organization of Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK), in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 401.
41. Jasentuliyana, The International Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT), in 1
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 401.
42. Gorove, The Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSA T), in 1 MANUAL
ON SPACE LAW 467.
43. Richard R. Colino is Vice-President and Manager of INTELSAT.
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Kolossov, 44 Jasentuliyana, 45 and Gorove, 46 respectively, describe four
international organizations in the field of space telecommunications: INTELSAT, the space telecommunications organization of
the western world; INTERSPUTNIK, its eastern counterpart;
INMARSAT, a specialized organization for maritime space telecommunications; and ARABSAT, an emerging regional telecommunication satellite organization amongst the member nations of
the Arab League. Of these four organizations, the Washingtonbased INTELSAT is definitely the most important and largest one.
Chapters XIII 47 and XIV, 48 written by Vereshchetin 411 and Kaltenecker, 50 discusses two regional organizations for space activities
in general, the East European INTERCOSMOS and the western
European Space Agency (ESA). Strangely lacking in part two of
volume I is a separate chapter on the United Nations COPUOS,
which after all is the forum through which most international space
law agreements have arisen. A study of COPUOS could have been
particularly useful and enlightening at a time when the committee, which so far has worked with a rule of unanimous consent, is
unable to reach agreement on such important matters as the Moon
Treaty, 50 · 1 direct satellite broadcasting and remote sensing.
As mentioned earlier, volume II contains the texts of existing
or draft international agreements in the field of space law, accompanied, where applicable, by a list of ratifications, signatures, accessions, a list of references to travaux preparatoires and a selected
bibliography. The list of references to the travaux preparatories is
especially invaluable. 51 The selected bibliography 52 is thorough, but
is in no way a replacement for Li's bibliography. 53 The very recent
44. Yuri M . Kolossov is Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union .
45. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana is Political Affairs Officer of the Outer Space Affairs Division of the U.N. Secretariat and Deputy Secretary of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space.
46. Stephen Gorove is Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi and Editor-inChief of the JOURNAL or SPACE LAW .
47. Vereshchetin, Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes (INTERCOSMOS), in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 415.
48. Kaltenecker, The European Space Agency (ESA) , in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 427.
49. Vladlen S. Vereshchetin is Vice-Chairman of INTERCOSMOS.
50. Hans Kaltenecker is the former director of the legal bureau of the European Space
Agency.
50.1. See supra footnote 9.1.
51. Travaux Preparatoires, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 455.
52. Selected Bibliography, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 527.
53. K.W. Li, WORLD WIDE SPACE LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978).
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Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of the Remote Sensing
of the Earth From Outer Space 54 stands somewhat alone in the
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, since, because of its very recent date, it is
not discussed in volume I.
Overall, the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW is a reflection of existing
international space law, and forms with its articles and texts an
excellent study book and reference work.

P .P. C. HAAN APPEL*
54. Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of the Remote Sensing of the Earth
From Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/33/162 (June 29, 1978) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON
SPACE LAW 367.
This convention was signed between the Soviet Union and a number of East European
countries.
• Associate Professor of Law, McGill University.
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